http://preo.ube.fr/shc/index.php?id=376 Publications de Auteurs Angela Palermo fr 0 http://preo.ube.fr/shc/index.php?id=375 Notre projet de recherche consiste à analyser les relations étroites qu’entretiennent la logique juridique et le raisonnement probabiliste dans la constitution du calcul des probabilités, c’est à dire depuis son origine au XVIIe siècle jusqu’au siècle des Lumières. L’étude de la logique juridique pousse inévitablement à examiner les rapports entre logique et rhétorique, et à repenser la rhétorique à la lumière de son incontournable rôle logique et, de même, à montrer que toute étude sur la logique juridique doit passer inévitablement par l’étude de la logique de l’argumentation. J'ai montré, contre la thèse qui réduit le raisonnement juridique à une simple rhétorique, que celui-ci répond à une exigence de vérité, ce qui exige de repenser la relation essentielle entre logique et rhétorique dans le champ juridique. La logique ici mobilisée est une logique de la probabilité, laquelle est appropriée à la rationalité pragmatique. C’est du même coup la relation entre logique juridique et logique probabiliste qui se trouve interrogée, à la fois dans une perspective historique, mais surtout du point de vue de philosophie de la science, puisque ces éléments constituent un bon point de départ pour se poser la question de la signification de la gnoséologie et, plus largement, de la validité des théories gnoséologiques. Mais pas seulement : en effet, nombre de philosophes contemporains des sciences ont mis l’accent sur le rôle des métaphores humanistes et des « sciences humaines » dans le développement des théories scientifiques. C’est en quoi consistent l’actualité de ces études et l’utilité de ces questions qui sont intéressantes parce qu’elles se posent à la limite entre la philosophie des sciences et la philosophie morale, brisant ainsi l’ancien dualisme qui a fait écran à la théorie de la connaissance pendant des siècles et qui a encore ses défenseurs dans le monde de certains philosophes analytiques. Nous avons donc montré que logique juridique et logique probabiliste peuvent être considérées comme des paradigmes gnoséologiques tout à fait nouveaux. When I started to study the relationship between legal logic and probabilistic logic, I immediately realized that this relationship could not really be understood without investigating more specifically the link logic-rhetoric included in it. A long philosophical tradition has accustomed us to consider the legal logic as essentially tied to the rhetoric and the latter as completely detached from the logic. With the word "rhetoric" we usually refers to the '"art of speaking well." But ρητορική τέχνη (retoriké tekne) that arises in the fifth century BC on empirical grounds of the art court has, from its birth, a practical purpose : it wants to be an instrument of persuasion, and the medium he uses is the εικός (eikόs), the plausible. One of the foundations of Greek logic is thus to be found on the empirical grounds of judicial logic. But even if the rhetoric was born with practical and not theoretical purposes, however, this fact requires a study of argumentation theory and its evidence, apart from the prejudice that, even if logic and rhetoric are both related to the argument, the logic should deal with the correct arguments while rhetoric deals with only persuasive arguments. Through historical and logical analysis drawn from Aristotle and which comes to consider the positions of prominent contemporary scholars such as Giuliani, Taruffo, Capozzi, Cellucci, Spranzi, etc., in this article I will show that, instead, logic and rhetoric have a strong bond which should be rethought so as to better understand the essence of legal logic, but also because the break of dualism logical-rhetoric can open much wider perspectives of reflection. Particularly I refer to the reflection of logical and moral relationship that, in turn, would lead us to reflect on the opposition between mind and body. In fact, when we turn a look at the history of logic, we will realize that, since ancient times, there were no sharp and radicals divisions between logical and rhetorical field and that, even in modern times, it is possible to draw a line of continuity between the field of rigorous proof and the field of demonstration of rhetoric, thanks to the recognizable theoretical role of metaphor. The etymology of the terms leads us into this direction. In fact, "dialectic" is from the greek διαλέγησται (dialegesthai) : we see clearly the root of λόγος which is the same verb in greek λογίζησται (logizesthai), and even if we normally translate the first term "debate" and the other with "reason", the two terms have got a common root which is "logos, id est ratio". Just the logic of Aristotle, often identified with a purely syllogistic logical with a purely deductive feature was born, instead, as a study of non-deductive logic of the argument that, in the meantime, should be considered as a logic of discovery and not of the simple justification. The same is true for some modern logics, such as that of Port-Royal (1662) greatly indebted to the grammar of Pierre de La Ramée, whose purpose is to create, on the model of the ars conjectandi, an entirely new logic that might reveal itself as an ars cogitandi. Such a logic, is, can be defined as "applied". The perfect model for these new legal logic is precisely the legal logic that, because of its necessary link with the rhetoric and the probability, can become the model to which we should inspire in order to build a form of practical rationality reachable with the tools provided by a logic inventive. It is just in this that the interest of these studies and the need to strengthen links between logic and rhetoric lie. Thinking in fact, that there is only a rigorous logic of deductive logic is like to let the logical lose its original function as organon. In order to move forward in this sense, the logic cannot do without the human sciences, as historically shown by the interpenetration of legal logic and probabilistic logic. To persist in wanting to separate the logic from the moral (if we are allowed to use the word in its latin meaning where the right is fully part) or, worse, to recognize the existence of a "less logical" where we may confine everything beyond the control of deductive, is like to recognize the failure of philosophy to which it will not speculate on the moral law and the humanities in general, using infinite words emptied of thought. Placing philosophical doctrines that see the rhetoric as the immense region of thought not formalized regarded as the only means of sciences such as jurisprudence that claim to stand up to logic, is like to express a tautology hardly solvable, as if we could imagine a language without logic or a mind without a body. In my theses, by the indissoluble bond logical – rhetoric seen through the eyes of some philosophers, I tried to highlight the very fact that the logic does not feed on pure determinism or simple mathematical calculation, but it can progress with the help of the humanities, just as occurred between the seventeenth and eighteenth century, that is to say when some lawyer-philosophers have attempted, through the construction of a probabilistic logic, to overcome the dualism to the benefit of knowledge conceived not as mere contemplation but as method for the resolution of problems of a practical nature. In this sense, legal logic and probabilistic logic in the modern era can be considered as new epistemological paradigms. mar., 19 déc. 2017 15:36:12 +0100 ven., 22 sept. 2023 15:32:12 +0200 http://preo.ube.fr/shc/index.php?id=375